Trajectory Analysis
The Failure of the West’s Continued Use of the Irish Model for Peace and its implications for Central Asia
The Failure of the West’s Continued Use of the Irish Model for Peace and its implications for Central Asia
The international community has failed to create a cohesive position on Afghanistan, and neither party, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan or the International Community has managed to create effective and sustainable dialogue. The interest in the provision of material support to Afghanistan by donor countries to the United Nations and food programs continues to diminish, and we are at a pivotal point due to the intersection of the political dynamics of the United States, and the shift in geopolitics in the wider region, namely the Middle East and Iran.
It would be remiss to also not consider that “induced failure” is part of the strategic policy of the United States regarding Afghanistan. The “Global War on Terror” has been a failure, terrorism has not declined; Islamic Jihadism has spread, particularly in Africa, and if the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan proves able to successfully govern, it would provide a model for other groups from Boko Haram, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen to Al Shabaab.
It is evident that Islamic Jihadism cannot be defeated with kinetic operations, and it is not illogical to conclude that the most effective way to counter it, is to let it defeat itself. The approach in Afghanistan initially bore the hallmarks of the method that was used to mitigate the Irish Republican Army (IRA), that is by allowing political participation, the IRA through Sinn Féin, has to accord to the rules and procedures of politics and the rule of law. The fundamental mistake in this approach is to consider the IRA and the IEA as analogous.
The responsibility of governing a country, the institutions required, and particularly an economy as fractured as Afghanistan is no small feat. It requires tremendous statecraft and sophisticated economic policy, and political foresight to be able to stabilise the economy and create growth. Even with the economic investment of the United States and the support of the international community the Republic was unsuccessful for a variety of reasons from corruption within the Republic, an extremely flawed approach to economic development by the United States, the inability to reach the provinces, and the tribalism which in terms of power-distribution resulted in extreme instances of nepotism.
The fiscal year in the United States ends on September 30th, and in August there is rapid spending to dispose of unspent budgets, and the budgets for the next financial year are locked in, therefore the budget allocation with the perceived failure to achieve goals for Afghanistan is dramatically diminished. The international development agencies that are required to support the needs of Afghanistan do not have anywhere near the necessary funding for their activities, and once defunded, refunding such budgets is extremely difficult. The next dimension that will push the international community’s interest away from Afghanistan are the U.S. Presidential elections, the U.S. electorate is not interested in Afghanistan; the election will be tumultuous with hard social divisions in the U.S.
The Middle East, on the other hand, is stabilizing, with the rapprochement between Saudi and Iran, violence in Yemen will likely decelerate, and with Syria being reinvited into the regional community, we will likely see a period of increased trade, and less desire to be involved in complex problems such as Afghanistan that do not offer clear gains.
There is the flawed perception that the West will not abandon Afghanistan, this was the same perception of the Republic until the last days, that after a US$2.3 trillion dollar spend within the country and 20 years of interaction, that the U.S., especially under a Democrat government, would not up and leave. They did. To believe that the international community cannot and will not do the same with the Islamic Emirate is a short-sighted perception, for all intents and purposes, they already have.
The Taliban perspective is one of victory, and that is a partial truth, the U.S. withdrawal was one of fatigue, and also Trump’s desire to create peace in the Middle East through the Abraham Accords along with the end of the war in Afghanistan. The perception of a ‘victory’ gives the Taliban the impression that ‘we won’, and you have to deal with us, that is not the case - the U.S. can simply leave, as it did with North Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Somalia. The depth of exit determines the degree of engagement and thereby economic interaction.
At the same time, the U.S., can point to the broad number of conferences, the efforts and engagement, the financial support, the humanitarian aid, and argue that at every turn, they offered the IEA the opportunity to be a part of the global community, and despite the best efforts, the U.S. was unable to create a viable partnership with the Emirate. With the nascent tension in China and the conflict in Ukraine, and the disharmony domestically, the U.S.’ responsible action is to focus on the Homeland. This is strategic and rationale as a response, and the recent talks with Qatar and Central Asia (26th-31st July 2023) with talks in Kazakhstan shows deference to the region.
The perception that Russia or China can step into the void left by a Western withdrawal is extremely flawed, Russia does not have the economic might to support Afghanistan and is not a reliable development partner. China finances through debt, not investment and China would likely be targeted by ISIS and ETIM, it does not take a significant number of terrorists to cause problems, at its peak the IRA fielded 200 active fighters, and among those 50 were vital to their cause.
The Doha Negotiations were led by the political office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, and this represented a potential friction, as the political office was not involved in the conflict directly, they were not sacrificing their lives for the Taliban cause. The integration of the political wing (Doha) and the military wing of the Taliban was a division that was never going to be easy and was likely to evolve into a contest for power, coupled with the tribalism within the Taliban, and air of concern about individuals that may have aligned to closely with the West and away from the ‘cause’, is reflecting more and more in power.
Chatham House recently published an article that reflects these same observations about the tensions between Kabul and Kandahar, and the concentration of power around the Noorzai Tribe and the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader is concentrating power around himself, and diminishing the power of Mullah Baradar and Siraj Haqqani. This is a common condition in political affairs when parties are driven apart, certain decisions become contextually logical, but are not pragmatic, as they precipitate greater instability, and create ‘collision courses’. In this case, a collision course between HQN and the Supreme Leader has serious potential, which would have dire consequences for the people of Afghanistan.
The other factor that will come into view very shortly is the anniversary of the fall of the Republic, August 15th, 2023. News media, politicians, and analysts will review the two years of Taliban rule, and with the Presidential election cycle spooling up, this will likely add momentum to disengagement.
Trajectory Analysis
A “trajectory analysis” is a specific form of threat analysis, rather than looking at clusters of threat or risk, we look at the broad range of geopolitical actors, the economic and social forces, and then groups or individuals and how they react to the composite of forces.
In this, we also consider ‘political momentum’, which can be best described as the inertial force of policy direction. When a policy is established, that policy is resourced, as financial capital, human capital, and narrative. The more resource that is committed, the greater the inertial energy inputted to the policy, and the more committed the action becomes. The more committed, the harder it becomes to avoid collision where groups have diametrically opposed policies.
Central Asia: Potential Impact and Mitigation Strategies
Central Asia has a significant risk profile from Afghanistan, particularly Uzbekistan which shares a border with Afghanistan - from fragmentation and refugee pressure to Jihadist activity. Any division in Afghanistan within the Taliban would empower ISKP and likely draw more fighters into Afghanistan from Central Asia and from other theatres, i.e. Syria and Iraq.
Therefore, the logical approach is how to prevent ‘contagion’ spreading from Afghanistan to these countries, which could be summarised as a policy of containment. Within containment, there is also the need to strengthen social cohesion, as stability and prosperity within Central Asia. Social cohesion is a strong defence against radicalism or civil unrest.
Central Asia has the “Regional Friendship and Cooperation Agreement”, and this was an important step in recognizing the shared interests of the region, that given the distance from global markets, and the different strategic advantages that each state holds, cooperation is the key to prosperity and stability.
We are now in a ‘risk timeline’, and it is important that Central Asia be proactive and not reactive, to focus on the collective needs, and with a particular view to regional security.
Disengagement
In the surrounding political dialogue parallel to the Doha Conference in May 2023 we presented the risk of ‘disengagement’ by the international community. We specifically chose the word disengagement in our papers to create a political term to describe the potential exit of the international community; the indicators were clear and present, and we would argue that the evidence is there that this occurred, despite the assurances by Secretary-General Antonio Guterres that this would not occur. The United Nations is dependent on donors for programs, and although the Secretary-General himself, may not wish to disengage, the actuality of disengagement is not within the control of the United Nations. The money necessary for Afghanistan is no longer present, and although the Taliban have increased export revenue, they are generating 30% of what is required to run the economy.
It is critical to accept that disengagement has occurred, and that windows of opportunity are close to complete closure, and this leaves two courses of action, both of which should be carried out.
“Last Ditch Effort”
A last-ditch is a final and fully committed effort towards dialogue and action, this was attempted in part at the Doha Conference (1-2 May 2023), which is further discussed below, and the likelihood of a positive outcome of a last-ditch effort with the geopolitical and U.S. political terrain is unlikely to yield. The various conferences being held are unlikely to yield a clear and viable course of action, because it is unclear what the IEA is willing to commit to, and there is a lack of understanding of the surrounding international law to achieve certain goals that the IEA desire.
This is notably visible in their desire to repatriate frozen funds to the Central Bank (“DAB”). DAB is structured under the Constitution to have separation from government to have independence and without a constitution, it is not possible to restore those funds. The original proposition for those funds, which we proposed in August 2021, was to have them administrated by a consortium from Qatar that would be an acceptable partner to the IEA and the U.S. and to have the requisite governance.
There are still no effective channels for communication with the IEA, nor has there been any effort to adapt the mechanisms of dialogue to explore the intersection of International Law and Sharia Law to find a commonality of purpose.
Doha Conference
The calling of a conference of the “envoys” to Afghanistan was an extraordinary measure that sadly had less than satisfactory results. The conference’s purpose became distracted by public misunderstandings of the role of the meeting, many feared Afghanistan’s future was yet again being decided without Afghan participation, the Taliban demanded to know why they were not included, as did women whose role in society has changed dramatically under the IEA rule.
There was an important discussion point, the West has approached the Taliban on the basis of international law, and not with an understanding of Deobandi-Pashtunism. The perception of the IEA is that the West comes to meetings with demands, and in return, the Taliban repeated their demands: “Drop sanctions, return funds, and recognise us.” There is no way to reconcile these perspectives: sanctions, frozen funds, and recognition are directly the function of international convention. However, Sharia Law is perfectly capable of governing a nation-state and does in many countries around the world.
Anas Haqqani and Saleem Hanafi echoed our sentiments. Yet there was no action taken, there was no meaningful transition of dialogue, there were no instances of friction used to show dialogue could work, dispute their being clear opportunities to hold productive conversations with the IEA, not least of all with the arbitrarily detained Britons - one of whom is in critical condition with regards to his health. The vital step for the relations between the IEA and the international community was to show dialogue that is contextually aware and not demand-based by either party could work, as both parties are equally guilty of the practice.
The inability to come to pragmatic solutions at these conferences will have the opposite effect on finding a way to engage with the Taliban, because there is no serious discussion around reconciliation of Sharia Law and International Law, and neither party has leaned forward in a meaningful way to achieve that.
The National Resistance Front
The National Resistance Front (NRF), as led by Ahmad Massoud, reflects values that are highly compatible with the West, from decentralisation, inclusion, and the right of women. The NRF since its inception has been unable to galvanise any support from Europe or the U.S. to facilitate resistance against the Taliban. If the NRF were to be supported, the possibility of the IEA failing on its own merits without Western interference becomes non-viable. To a lesser degree, it may also induce a renewal of terror attacks in the U.S. and Europe, and would position the conflict against the Taliban as a proxy-war.
On the surface, the NRF with its compatibility, the method of takeover of the country by the Taliban, would seem a fit - an indigenous movement to overthrow the Taliban. Yet, it has been left to struggle on its own, and given minimal participation in political discussion concerning Afghanistan. The West remains committed to dialogue with the Taliban at the same time while using the only modus of pressure available being sanctions, and relatively weak enforcement of those.
Let the Problem Solve Itself
One also needs to consider if failure is a strategic objective of the West, that at some point with the failure to engage, there was another kind of withdrawal modeled after the failure of the Irish model, and it has a distinct logic to it when viewed through the paradigm, ‘How do you defeat Islamic Jihadism?’ - the obvious answer is, “Let it defeat itself.’
The human cost is calculable, 38 million people placed at risk, and this again is not without precedent, Yemen has a similar population, but with Yemen, we at least see Facebook Campaigns to donate money, with Afghanistan it’s impossible to send money into the country under international sanctions, and we don’t even see the occasional celebrity appealing to the public to help child facing malnutrition as we do with Yemen.